The first meaningful improvement on MFA in over a decade.
Threshold approvals and enterprise policy for shared privileged accounts: exchange admins, banking portals, and registrars.
MFA still rests on a secret anyone can copy.
Phishable shared secrets
A six-digit code typed into the wrong page works just as well for the attacker.
Codes copied across devices
Shared accounts mean the same seed lives on phones, laptops, and password managers.
Costly offboarding
When someone leaves, every account they could reach needs its seed rotated by hand.
Standing credentials
Seeds sit on devices around the clock, waiting to be stolen.
No single party ever holds the full MFA key. Access requires a threshold approval.
Castle splits the key with multi-party computation. Shares combine only when your policy is met, and only long enough to produce one code.
Where the MFA key lives
Technical deep dive
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Architecture, threat model, and cryptographic design in depth. Reviewed and sent personally by our team.
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From request to code in one approval flow.
Start from the login you already trust.
Users sign in to Castle through your identity provider. Groups and roles flow in from SSO, so policy follows your org chart.
- SAML and OIDC supported
- No new passwords to manage
Approvals, set by policy.
A request for a sensitive account goes to the approvers your policy names. Nothing is generated until the threshold is met.
- Thresholds per account, such as 2 of 3
- Every approval recorded
One code, then it's gone.
Key shares combine inside a secure enclave to produce a single time-limited code. The full key never exists on any device.
- Works with any service that uses authenticator codes
- Codes expire in seconds
Offboarding in one tap.
Remove a person and their access ends across every shared account. No seeds to rotate, no devices to chase.
- Driven by your IdP or done in Castle
- Audit trail of who lost access, and when
Works with
- Okta
- Microsoft Entra
- Google Workspace
- Any SAML or OIDC provider
Key shares in hardware. Nothing readable at rest.
Key shares live in AWS Nitro Enclaves and HSMs. Storage is zero-knowledge, so Station70 cannot reconstruct a key on its own.
Harden your most sensitive accounts.
See threshold approvals running against your identity provider in a 30-minute technical briefing.
Request the Castle technical whitepaper
Architecture, threat model, and cryptographic design in depth. Reviewed and sent personally by our team.
Something went wrong sending your request. Try again or email info@station70.com.
Request received. Our team will review it and send the paper to your inbox.